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MOSES AND MODERNISM 
Neil H. Cogan* 
THE BILL OF RIGHTS AND THE STATES: THE COLONIAL AND R.E.VO-
LUTIONARY ORIGINS OF AMERICAN LIBERTIES. Edited by Patrick T. 
Conley and John P. Kaminski. Madison: Madison House. 1992. Pp. 
xxiii, 542. Cloth, $39.95; paper, $ 24.95. 
STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: LITIGATING INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS, 
CLAIMS AND DEFENSES. By Jennifer Friesen. New York: Matthew 
Bender. 1992. Looseleaf binder in one volume. $140. 
REFERENCE GUIDES TO THE STATE CONSTITUTIONS OF THE UNITED 
STATES. Westport: Greenwood Press. 1991-1994. Nineteen 
volumes. $55-89.50. 
And now, 0 Israel, give heed to the laws and norms which I am in-
structing you to observe, so that you may thrive and be able to occupy 
the land that the Lord, the God of your fathers, is giving you. You shall 
not add anything to what I command you or take anything away from it, 
but keep the commandments of the Lord your God that I enjoin upon 
you. 1 
I warn everyone who hears the words of the prophecy of this book; if 
anyone adds to these words, God will add to him the plagues described 
in this book; and if anyone takes away from the words of the book of this 
prophecy, God will take away his share in the tree oflife and in this holy 
city, which are described in this book.2 
I. FORMS OF MOSAIC FuNDAMENTAL LAW 
Abraham, not Moses, gave us monotheism. 
Moses gave us fundamental law - its forms at least, if not much of 
its content as well. The forms rule us, not from the grave, but from 
ever-pregnant texts that shape our beliefs about fundamental law. The 
recent spate of books on state constitutional law and the prominent 
criticism of the need for such law prompt this essay about the forms of 
fundamental law. 
Mosaic fundamental law, set forth in the Five Books of Moses in 
such texts as the Ten Commandments and the Mosaic Codes, provides 
* Dean, Quinnipiac College School of Law. Dipl. 1964, Gratz College; B.A. 1966, LL.B. 
1969, University of Pennsylvania. - Ed. This essay is dedicated to my father, Jacob Cogan, 
zikhrono le-o/am. 
1. Deuteronomy 4:1-2, in THE TORAH, THE FIVE BOOKS OF MOSES 330 (Jewish Publication 
Socy. 1962) [hereinafter THE TORAH]. 
2. 38 THE ANCHOR BIBLE: REVELATION 22:18 (J. Massyngberde Ford ed., 1975). 
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the covenantal duties of the people to the Sovereign God and to one 
another. According to the story related in the texts, God transmitted 
fundamental law at Sinai through Moses to the people;3 the law is 
founded in truth and expressive of justice. Mosaic fundamental law is 
distinguished from other Israelite laws, norms, and practices not dis-
cussed in the biblical texts, such as those governing hereditary succes-
sion and commercial law, that were in effect prior to and 
contemporaneously with the transmission of fundamental law but that 
God did not prescribe in depth and detail. 4 
On the face of the texts, the form of Mosaic fundamental law con-
forming to the Sinaitic story is ostensibly as follows: The law is not 
withheld, hidden, or discretionary; it is express. Typically, it is not 
general, vague, or ambiguous; it is specific and intended to be clear. 
Although delivered orally at first, it is then written. 5 
There is no other fundamental law; it is exclusive. The law comes 
from a central, high authority - God; it is descendent. God's law 
trumps other laws, norms, and practices; it is supreme. 
Finally, the law does not change, being neither added to nor sub-
tracted from; it is fixed. 6 The law, too, does not cease with the death 
of Moses or any other prophet or leader; it is enduring, indeed 
etemal.7 
We may rightfully term the form of fundamental law conforming 
to the Sinaitic story as "the static form." The more express, specific, 
and written the law, the less judges can add or subtract. The more 
exclusive, centralized, and supreme the law, the less other laws, 
norms, and practices can cause it to progress. Plainly, the more law 
depends upon ancient revelation, the less competing law can arise. 
3. "And this is the Instruction - the laws and the norms - that the Lord your God has 
commanded [me] to impart to you •..• " Deuteronomy 6:1, in THE TORAH, supra note 1, at 336. 
4. See NAHUM M. SARNA, EXPLORING EXODUS: THE HERITAGE OF BIBLICAL ISRAEL 
170-71 (1986); MICHAEL FISHBANE, BIBLICAL INTERPRETATION IN ANCIENT ISRAEL 91 
(1985). It is noteworthy that prior to the transmission of the Ten Commandments and any of the 
Mosaic Codes, Moses sat as a judge to settle disputes. See Exodus 18:13-26, in THB TORAH, 
supra note 1, at 131-32. 
5. "When He finished speaking with him on Mount Sinai, He gave Moses the two tablets of 
the Pact, stone tablets inscribed with the finger of God." Exodus 31:18, in THE TORAH, supra 
note 1, at 157. 
"And the Lord said to Moses: Write down these commandments, for in accordance with 
these commandments I make a covenant with you and with Israel." Exodus 34:27, in THB TO-
RAH, supra note 1, at 163. 
6. This characteristic, described in the opening quotation, continued into Talmudic dis-
course. Rabbi Meir said, "My son, be careful, because thy work is the work of Heaven; if thou 
omittest a single letter or addest a single letter, thou dost as a consequence destroy the whole 
world." BABYLONIAN TALMUD, Sotah 20a. 
7. For a comparison of Roman "ethical rules" with Biblical "categorical injunctions," see 
DAVID DAUBE, FORMS OF ROMAN LEGISLATION 62-64 (1956) ("[T]he Roman percept is Wis-
dom, instruction, conservative, the Biblical, the Will of God, adjuration, revolutionary."); for a 
comparison of Roman, Old Testament, and New Testament forms, see DAVID DAUBB, The 
Form Is the Message, in ANCIENT JEWISH LAW 71 (1981). 
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The Sinaitic story, however, is not all there is. Modem critical 
Bible scholarship argues that the Five Books of Moses include texts of 
several writers or groups of writers, such as the J (Jahwist), E (Elohis-
tic), D (Deuteronomistic), and P (Priestly) writers; JE, the historiogra-
pher of J and E; and R, the redactor of JE, D, and P. 8 These writers 
wrote during the course of more than five centuries and in several 
communities within the Kingdom of Israel, the Kingdom of Judah, 
and the Transjordan. 9 
The texts of these writers differ in many respects. They differ in 
language and style. They differ in their narrative of events from the 
Creation to the death of Moses. Most important, for our concerns, 
they differ remarkably at times about the form, content, and validity of 
laws, norms, and practices. to 
For example, P, perhaps more so than other writers, used words 
more general than specific, such as in God's commandments to Israel 
to be a holy people: "You shall not coerce your neighbor .... You 
shall not insult the deaf . . . . You shall not render an unfair decision 
. . . . You shall not hate your kinsman in your heart .... Love your 
neighbor as yourself .... " 11 In addition, each of the writers, but P 
and D in particular, differs as to such rights as property in women, 
children, and slaves and such religious duties as tithing. 12 Each of the 
writers presents us with significantly differing corpora of the funda-
mental law governing Israel in its covenant with God. 
These differing texts were redacted within one sacred document, 
known as the Five Books of Moses, and they were canonized.13 This 
redaction is remarkable, given the ostensibly static form of fundamen-
tal law. It is simply remarkable that a text expressing the covenant 
between a people and its one God would allow such differences. 
A likely explanation is that while the form of Mosaic fundamental 
law conforming to the Sinaitic story is presented in what appears to be 
a static form, much of that law was in fact the product of what we may 
8. See generally RICHARD ELLIOTI FRIEDMAN, WHO WROTE THE BIBLE? (1989). D is 
typically described as two writers, Dtr1 and Dtr2• Other writers include Hand T. The writers 
described in the text and in this footnote authored not only parts of the Five Books of Moses but 
parts of the books of the Hebrew Bible through Second Kings. 
9. See 4A THE ANCHOR BIBLE: NUMBERS 1-20, at 48-84 (Baruch A. Levine ed., 1993) 
(discussing different sources in the Book of Numbers); YEHEZKEL KAUFMANN, THE RELIGION 
OF lsRAEL 153-211 (M. Greenberg ed. & trans., abr. ed. 1960). 
10. See 5 THE ANCHOR BIBLE: DEUTERONOMY 1-11, at 19-35 (Moshe Weinfeld ed., 1991) 
[hereinafter DEUTERONOMY]; KAUFMANN, supra note 9, at 166-72. 
11. See Leviticus 19, in THE TORAH, supra note l, at 216-18. It may be that H, a writer in 
his or her own regard, and also a redactor of P, is responsible for these general words. See 
ISRAEL KNOHL, THE SANCTUARY OF SILENCE: A STUDY OF THE PRIESfLY STRATA IN THE 
PENTATEUCH 11-16, 70 (1992) (in Hebrew). 
12. See DEUTERONOMY, supra note 10, at 19-35; KAUFMANN, supra note 9, at 166-72. 
13. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 8, at 217-33. Friedman suggests that Ezra was the redactor. 
Id. at 218, 223-33. 
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rightfully term "a progressive form" of lawmaking. Modem critical 
Bible scholarship informs us that the texts of J, E, D, P, and others 
reflected a crystallization of understandings and traditions that had 
evolved over cenBitles and that had been influenced by the transmis-
sion of differing texts, by contact with differing Israelite and non-Israe-
lite tribes and peoples, and by the differing influences of political, 
economic, and social events within the region.14 The scholarship in-
forms us, too, that the evolution and influences notwithstanding, each 
set of understandings and traditions was considered divinely transmit-
ted, certainly at the time of its crystallization and no doubt through 
the process of evolution as wen.1s 
Thus, when R, the redactor, set to work, he or she had the com-
bined text of JE and the texts of D and P, each fixed and divinely 
transmitted. Each had much in common with the other - the cov-
enant between the people and God and the structure of Mosaic funda-
mental law - but each differed from the other, too, even regarding the 
content and wording of the Ten Commandments. 
As best we know, R edited the narrative accounts of JE, D, and P 
into the wonderful narratives we now have. But he or she left the legal 
corpora of the writers intact, despite their significant differences. 16 
The redactor did so, I suggest, because each set of legal texts did ad-
here to the same concept of covenant and to the same structure of 
Mosaic fundamental law, and because each set of legal texts did assert 
divine transmission. Under these circumstances, no set could be ig-
nored or discarded, or even revised. 
R thus left us with an example - a inost influential example - of 
a people who were given, who were able to accept, and who thrived for 
fifteen centuries on a text that combined at least three differing ac-
counts of fundamental law.17 
II. MOSAIC FORMS IN STATE AND FEDERAL FUNDAMENTAL 
LAW 
Both the static and progressive forms of Mosaic fundamental law 
influenced the framers of American constitutions and documents -
even the positivists among them, for whom Reason had replaced 
God.18 This is not to gainsay the influence of the natural law philoso-
14. See MORTON SMITH, PALESTINIAN PARTIES AND POLITICS THAT SHAPED THE OLD 
TESTAMENT 11-42 (1971). 
15. See KAUFMANN, supra note 9, at 172; FISHBANE, supra note 4, at 277 (noting that each 
tradition had "an auth_oritative, even divine, status"). 
16. See id. at 166. 
17. On the Jewish concern with history, see Y OSEF HA YIM YERUSHALMI, ZAKHOR: JEWISH 
HISrORY AND JEWISH MEMORY (1982); YOSEF HAYIM YERUSHALMI, FREUD'S MOSES 19-35 
(1991). 
18. The static and progressive forms influenced English and other lawmakers, too. See, e.g., 
MAGNA CARTA chs. 39 ("No free man shall be taken or imprisoned or disseised or outlawed or 
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phers, English lawm~ers, and the Hebr~w and Christian Bibles upon 
the content of American fundamental law. The influence of the Five 
Books of Moses on the form of American fund·amental law, however, 
is both important in fact and useful for anruysis. . 
On their face, the forms of American constitutions and documents 
relating to fundamental law have many of t4e characteristics of the 
static Mosaic form. They are written, express, and specific:19 They 
are explicitly fundamental20 and - within their jurisdictions -
supreme.21 This is not surpri~ing because American fundamental law 
began with the Massachusetts Body of Liberties, its form reflecting the 
strong influence of the Mosaic Codes. 22 American fundamental law 
continued with Penn's Laws Agreed Upon in England, its form influ-
enced by both the Hebrew and Christian Bibles. 23 
The reality of American fundamental law, however, is that the pro-
gressive Mosaic form has been dominant. Thus, although there are 
state and federal constitutions and bills and declarations of rights in 
written form, many refer directly or indirectly to or assume the exist-
ence of natural rights not written in the texts. 24 Although the texts are 
exiled or in any way ruined, nor will we go or send against him, except by the lawful judg[]ment 
of his peers or by the law of the land."), 40 ("To no one will we sell, to no one will we deny or 
delay right or justice."), reprinted in J.C. HOLT, MAGNA CARTA app. 6, at 461 (2d ed. 1992). 
19. See Bradley Chapin, Written Rights: Puritan and Quaker Procedural Guarantees, 114 
PA. MAG. HISr. & BIOGRAPHY 323 (1990). 
Christ fulfilled the prophecy of Isaiah and Joel by promising to "write my law in their 
hearts." Even so, biblical texts contained "subordinate, secondary, and declaratory" rules 
that illuminated the rule which was "the eternal precepts of the spirit." The Quakers com-
mitted themselves to definite written law, because statutes acted as guides to the consciences 
of witnesses and jurors by illuminating Christian equity. 
Id. at 327 (quoting WILLIAM PENN, A DISCOURSE OF THE GENERAL RULE OF FAITH AND 
PRACTICE, AND JUDGE OF CONTROVERSIE 21, 25 (London, T. Sowle 1699)). 
20. "[T]he charter ofliberties ..•. is hereby declared and approved, and shall be for ever held 
for fundamental in the government thereof .... " William Penn, Laws Agreed Upon in England. 
in SOURCES OF OUR LIBERTIES 216, 216 (Richard L. Perry & John c. Cooper eds., 1959). 
21. The free fruition of such liberties Immunities and priveledges as humanitie, Civilitie, 
and Christianitie call for as due to every man in his place and proportion without impeach-
ment and Infringement hath ever bene and ever will be the tranquillitie and Stabilitie of 
Churches and Commonwealths. And the deniall or deprivall thereof, the disturbance if not 
the ruine of both. 
Nathaniel Ward, Massachusetts Body of Liberties, pmbl. (1641), in SOURCES OF OUR LIBER-
TIES, supra note 20, at 148, 148. 
22. See GEORGE L. HASKINS, LAW AND AUTHORITY IN EARLY MASSACHUSETIS: A 
STUDY IN TRADmON AND DESIGN 124-31 (1960); A.E. DICK HOWARD, THE ROAD FROM 
RUNNYMEDE: MAGNA CARTA AND CONSTITUTIONALISM IN AMERICA 35-37 (1968). 
23. See Chapin, supra note 19, at 3?4-29. 
24. E.g .• U.S. CONST. amend. IX ("The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, 
shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people."); MASS. CoNST. pt. 1, 
art. I ("All people are born free and equal and have certain natural, essential and unalienable 
rights; among which may be reckoned the right of enjoying and defending their lives and liber-
ties; that of acquiring, possessing and protecting property; in fine, that of seeking and obtaining 
their safety and happiness."); see HADLEY ARKES;BEYOND THE CoNSTITUTION 58-80 (1990); 
cf. MORTON WHITE, PHILOSOPHY, THE FEDERALIST, AND THE CoNSTITUTION 25-30 (1987) 
(stating that the Federalists embraced the Lockean idea of natural rights); Suzanna Sherry, The 
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express, most - if not all - assume or refer to principles such as 
judicial review and separation of powers. As is well known, just as the 
progressive Mosaic form uses words such as love andfair, so American 
fundamental texts often use words that are not specific but invitingly 
- or irritatingly - open-ended. 25 
More importantly, just as English lawmakers before them, so 
American Framers were familiar with centuries-old arguments, re-
newed in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, that the Five 
Books of Moses must have been written by authors in addition to or 
other than Moses.26 While they may not have been familiar as yet 
with J, E, D, P, JE, and R, the Framers were aware that the sacred 
text contained a variety of versions of fundamental law, inconsistent in 
important respects and worded variously. The acceptable variousness 
of fundamental law in the Bible was a significant concept in the mind 
of American Framers, leading them to believe, and to act upon the 
belief, that each community's insight into natural law and the rights of 
Englishmen was worthy of respect. 
Thus, it is entirely unsurprising that the Massachusetts Body of 
Liberties, the Laws Agreed Upon in England, and such important sub-
sequent texts as the Virginia Declaration of Rights were in variance 
with one another. Nor is it surprising that state constitutions and 
state constitutional construction have borrowed from other state con-
stitutions and constructions whatever is fitting and comfortable and 
have rejected whatever is not. And it is not surprising that the na-
tional set of fundamental laws is bound together only by what is fun-
damental to the American scheme of justice. 
Moreover, American fundamental law is both ascendent and de-
scendent, not flXed. The people have ratified the texts of federal and 
state constitutions and are continually revising them. The Federal 
Constitution has been amended twenty-seven times; Congress pro-
posed each amendment, which state legislatures then ratified. By con-
trast, most state constitutions have been amended more often, 
frequently with amendments originated by local groups, associations, 
and communities, and the people have ratified them directly. 
Thus, the reality of American fundamental law is that its form has 
typically been more progressive than static. Like the Five Books of 
Early Virginia Tradition of Extratextua/ Interpretation, in TOWARD A USABLE PAsr: LIBERTY 
UNDER STATE CoNSTITUTIONS 157 (Paul Finkelman & Stephen E. Gottlieb eds., 1991). 
25. "Every person within this Jurisdiction, whether Inhabitant or forreiner shall enjoy the 
same justice and law, that is generitll for the plantation, which we constitute and execute one 
towards another without partialitie or delay." Ward, supra note 21, at 148. 
26. Ever since the canonization of the Bible, there have been prominent critics of Moses' 
authorship of the Five Books of Moses, including such figures as Spinoza. Contemporary critics 
include THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 415-27 (C.B. Macpherson ed., Penguin Books 1968) 
(1651); and JEAN AsTR.uc, CONJECTURES SUR LES MEMOIRES ORIGINAUX: DONT IL PARAIT 
QUE MOYSE S'EST SERVI POUR COMPOSER LE LIVRE DE LA GENESE •.• (1753). 
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Moses, there are differing traditions within communities, namely, the 
states. Nonetheless, like the Five Books of Moses, there is broad ad-
herence to certain basic rules and principles, such as the fundamental 
aspects of due process, the floor below which no state goes. 
Until now, these have been the forms of fundamental law in the 
United States. The law, the literature, and most importantly the peo-
ple have assumed it. Until now, too, there has been little dissent to the 
arrangement, however unstudied. 
III. THE LITERATURE OF PROGRESSIVE STATE FUNDAMENTAL 
LAW 
The legal literature of state fundamental law was, but is no longer, 
sparse. This is due in part to a new realization by lawyers and judges 
that the form of most state fundamental law is progressive rather than 
static, and also to an awakening within many communities that state 
fundamental law may be revised by amendment as well as construc-
tion. To put it crassly, there is now movement in state constitutional 
law, and there is now a market for books about the movement. 
Recent publications include collections of papers, 27 surveys, 28 
teaching materials,29 and a practitioners' treatise.30 The Bill of Rights 
and the States, edited by Patrick T. Conley31 and John P. Kaminski,32 
deserves special recognition for the excellence of its scholarship. It 
collects essays on the development of fundamental law through the 
eighteenth century in each of fourteen original states. Each essay ends 
with a comprehensive bibliography of a state's fundamental law, and 
the collection concludes with a comprehensive bibliographic essay on 
the Federal Bill of Rights (pp. 461-514). The book is invaluable for 
anyone studying American fundamental law, both state and federal. 
Professor Jennifer Friesen's State Constitutional Law 33 deserves 
special recognition, too. Besides being the one and only practitioners' 
treatise on developments in state fundamental law in each state, it is 
clearly written, well organized, and comprehensive. It is a vital re-
source for any practitioner contemplating rights litigation. 
27. See, e.g .• PROTECTING INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS: THE ROLE OF STATE CONSfITUTIONAL-
ISM (Barbara Wolfson ed., 1993); TOWARD A USABLE PASf, supra note 24. 
28. See, e.g .• EMERGING ISSUES IN STATE CONSfITUTIONAL LAW (Gerald. E. Weiss ed., 
1991); Fourth Annual Issue on State Constitutional Law, 23 RUTGERS L.J. 723 (1992). 
29. JOHN E. COOPER & THOMAS C. MARKS, JR., FLORIDA C0NsrITUTIONAL LAW (1992); 
ROBERT F. WILLIAMS, STATE C0NSfITUTIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS (2d ed. 1993). 
30. JENNIFER FRIESEN, STATE C0NSfITUTIONAL LAW:' LITIGATING INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS, 
CLAIMS AND DEFENSES (1993). 
31. Professor Emeritus and Lecturer in History, Providence College. Mr. Conley is also a 
practicing attorney. 
32. Director, Center for the Study of the American Constitution at the University of Wiscon-
sin, Madison. 
33. Jennifer Friesen is Professor of Law, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles. 
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Of most moment, Greenwood Press has committed itself to pub-
lishing Reference Guides to the State Constitutions, a series of one-vol-
ume guides to each of the fifty state constitutions, and has to date 
published nineteen of the Guides. 34 The Guides' authors ably summa-
rize the constitutional history of each state, synopsize most provisions 
of the constitution in force, and provide bibliographic sources not 
found elsewhere. Nowhere else can lawyers and scholars find a com-
pact summary of each state's fundamental law. The Guides, too, are 
an important resource for the growing body of lawyers who do state 
constitutional litigation and a valuable educational aid for the many 
lawyers who want to do such litigation. 
Both The Bill of Rights and the States and the Guides discuss the 
particularity and specialness of each state's fundamental law, and 
Friesen's State Constitutional Law does so both by state and by groups 
of states. The Guides and State Constitutional Law assume, correctly, 
that each state has a diverse set of groups, associations, and communi-
ties and its own particular set of texts and historical memories and 
that, as a result, the states may genuinely differ even as to aspects of 
fundamental law. Although none of the authors asserts that each state 
is unique in each and every aspect of fundamental law, they nonethe-
less rightly assume that there may be many particulars in which a state 
differs from other states and that these differences are important. 
Where there are no differences, the books say so. 
Although there are no discussions of form beyond references to 
principles of federalism, the Guides and State Constitutional Law un-
derstand that there is a basic minimum of liberty, equality, and fair-
ness applicable to each state. Each understands, too, that beyond the 
basic minimum each state may develop its own tradition of heightened 
protection. 
IV. MODERNIST CRmcs OF PROGRESSIVE STATE FUNDAMENTAL 
LAW 
Several critics, two of whom are discussed below, reject the contin-
34. JOHN D. LESHY, THE ARIZONA STATE CoNSTITUTION (1993); KAY c. Goss, THE 
ARKANSAS STATE CoNSTITUTION (1993); JOSEPH R. GRODIN ET AL., THE CALIFORNIA STATE 
CoNSTITUTION (1993); WESLEY W. HORTON, THE CoNNECTICUT STATE CONSTITUTION 
(1993); TALBOT D'ALEMBERTE, THE FLORIDA STATE CONSTITUTION (1991); ANNE F. LEE, 
THE HAWAII STATE CONSTITUTION {1993); DONALD CROWLEY & FLORENCE HEFFRON, THE 
IDAHO STATE CoNSTITUTION (1994); FRANCIS H. HELLER, THE KANSAS STATE CONSTITU· 
TION {1992); LEE HARGRAVE, THE LoUISIANA STATE CONSTITUTION (1991); MARSHALL J. 
TINKLE, THE MAINE STATE CoNSTITUTION (1992); JOHN W. WINKLE III, THE MISSISSIPPI 
STATE CONSTITUTION {1993); ROBERT D. MIEWALD & PETER J. LoNGO, THE NEBRASKA 
STATE CONSTITUTION {1993); MICHAEL W. BOWERS, THE NEVADA STATE CONSTITUTION 
{1993); ROBERT F. WILLIAMS, THE NEW JERSEY STATE CoNSTITUTION (1990); PETER J. 
GALIE, THE NEW YORK STATE CoNSTITUTION (1991); JOHN V. ORTH, THE NORTH CARO· 
LINA STATE CoNSTITUTION {1993); LEWIS L. LASKA, THE TENNESSEE ST.,_TE CONSTITUTION 
(1990); WILLIAM C. HILL, THE VERMONT STATE CoNSTITUTION (1992); ROBERT B. KEITER & 
TIM NEWCOMB, THE WYOMING STATE CoNSTITUTION (1993). 
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uing validity of the forms of American fundamental law and the value 
of the literature discussed above. They argue that there is no need for 
a progressive state fundamental law. One critic argues, for example, 
that the states should abandon the field to the national government. 35 
Another argues that the role of the states is to contribute to an Ameri-
can constitutionalism. - a set of national rights to liberty, equality, 
and fairness. 36 Each; in his own way, argues for an exclusive national 
fundamental law, and each assumes that this national fundamental 
law has no need of differing state fundamental law. 
A. The Argument for No State Fundamental Law 
Professor James Gardner's article, The Failed Discourse of State 
Constitutionalism, 31 has two parts: an empirical part arguing that 
state constitutional law discourse and, in effect, state constitutional 
law have failed; and a political part arguing that state constitutional 
law ought to fail. 
In the empirical part, Gardner examines 254 appellate opinions re-
ported for 1990 from seven states - California, Kansas, Louisiana, 
Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New York, and Virginia - in which 
the state's highest court arguably decided a state constitutional law 
issue. 38 After examination, Gardner finds that the exemplar state con-
stitutional law opinions are "confusing, conflicting, and essentially 
unintelligible. "39 
Comparing the discourse in these state decisions to federal consti-
tutional law discourse, he finds, with only a handful of exceptions, no 
distinct discussion of "text, framers' intent, constitutional theory, judi-
cial precedent, and societal values."40 Gardner concludes from these 
findings that "the failure of state courts to develop a coherent dis-
course of state constitutional law - that is, a language in which it is 
possible for participants in the legal system to make intelligible claims 
about the meaning of state constitutions" - is the primary reason for 
the kinds of state constitutional law opinions he found.41 
I have discussed elsewhere some of the empirical weaknesses of 
Gardner's approach.42 Gardner's snapshot of state constitutionalism 
- aIJ. examination of seven states during one calendar year - fails to 
35. James A. Gardner, 11te Failed Discourse of State Constitutionalism, 90 MICH. L. R.Ev. 
761 (1992). 
36. Paul W. Kahn, Interpretation and Authority in State Constitutionalism, 106 HARV. L. 
REV. 1147 (1993). 
37. Gardner, supra note 35. 
38. Id. at 780 n.68. 
39. Id. at 763. 
40. Id. at 778. 
41. Id. at 763-64, 804. 
42. Neil H. Cogan, In Praise of Diverse Discourse, 5 ST. THOMAS L. R.Ev. 173 (1992). 
1356 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 92:1347 
take into account that state constitutionalism was dormant until the 
1970s and that federal constitutional provisions such as the Privileges 
or Immunities, Due Process, and Equal Protection Clauses took far 
longer for commentators to develop into an intelligible discourse fol-
lowing their dormancy. The snapshot fails to discuss subject areas, 
such as privacy and equality, in which state courts and state constitu-
tional amendments have made significant developments. The snap-
shot also fails to give adequate consideration to the absence, until 
recently, of a significant literature for practitioners and students. A 
more complete reading of state judicial decisionmaking would show, I 
have argued,43 that state fundamental law discourse is as intelligent as 
federal fundamental law discourse. 
In addition, because of his concentration on judicial decisionmak-
ing, Gardner misses - as does Paul Kahn, the other critic examined 
here - the discourse in groups, associations, and communities as they 
seek to revise and amend state constitutions. He misses the fact that 
much of the movement in state constitutionalism results from initia-
tives respecting such rights as the right to privacy and the rights of 
women, the physically handicapped, and victims of crime. 
In the political part of his article, Gardner argues that reliance 
upon state constitutional law adjudication for the protection of funda-
mental rights is not simply ill-founded but actually dangerous to the 
protection of those rights. He argues that reliance on state decision-
making undermines our national identity and the role of the U.S. Con-
stitution as the embodiment of our national values.44 Thus, Gardner 
urges reliance on federal constitutional law adjudication - and its 
paradigm of discourse - for the protection of fundamental rights, and 
he even supports - but does not now urge - the eventual demise of 
state constitutions and the states along with them. 45 
This argument misses the significant concept taught by Mosaic 
fundamental law, as well as by our own history: namely, that a nation 
may have an identity, de".elop national values, and have fundamental 
laws and principles in common, while nonetheless tolerating within 
communities and regions differing understandings and traditions and 
even different fundamental laws, norms, and practices. There need not 
be one law respecting speech in shopping centers, if some states wish 
to expand speech beyond the federal minimum of protection. There 
need not be one law regarding the disabled, if some states wish to ex-
pand protection beyond the federal minimum of protection. The na-
43. See id. at 175-76. 
44. See Gardner, supra note 35, at 823-30. 
45. Id. Gardner assumes, of course, that federal fundamental law no longer has any need to 
refer to or incorporate state fundamental law. See id. at 770-78 (asserting that federal constitu-
tionalism is superior to and should be a model for state discourse). 
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tion is better for the federal minimum, and the nation is better for the 
communities committed to expanded freedom. 
B. The Argument for Participation in American Fundamental Law 
Professor Paul Kahn's recent article, Interpretation and Authority 
in State Constitutionalism, 46 rejects a state constitutionalism premised 
on "unique state sources," that is, on "the text of the state constitu-
tion, the history of its adoption and application, ana the unique, his-
torically identifiable qualities of the state community."47 Although 
Kahn does not expressly assert that there are no such unique state 
sources, he does argue that there no longer are vibrant state communi-
ties - at least none that can become the source for vibrant state con-
stitutionalism. He argues further that even if there were such 
communities, state constitutionalism unique to each would be incon-
sistent with trends in American constitutionalism and interpretative 
debate. 
Kahn's assessment of state communities lacks rigor. Although he 
does not purport to present an empirically sound and complete assess-
ment in his article, his dismissal of the vibrancy of state communities 
deserves analysis and, if appropriate, rejection. 
Kahn begins his essay by disparaging local public life and lauding 
national public life. People no longer feel constrained by the authority 
of local associations, such as the "church, family, town, local militia, 
unions, schools, and political parties," he declares.48 "These tradi-
tional forms of local association have come to be seen as nothing more 
than the products of individual choice."49 Similarly, state and local 
communities are only the aggregate of those individuals who choose to 
reside in a particular area. "Local public life is now often identified 
with prejudice, discrimination, censorship, and ideological rigidity."50 
By contrast, "[m]odem constitutional law ... has generally focused on 
establishing national political authority."51 "The individual citizen 
turns to the national government for protection from these constraints 
on his or her freedom."52 
Kahn's cited empirical basis for these arguments is a series of U.S. 
Supreme Court decisions, announced between 1962 and 1980.53 These 
decisions, in which an individual's liberty claim prevailed against a 
local community or association, assertedly support Kahn's argument 
46. Kahn, supra note 36. 
47. Id. at 1147. 
48. Id. at 1148-49 (footnotes omitted). 
49. Id. at 1149. 
SO. Id. 
51. Id. at 1148. 
52. Id. at 1149. 
53. Id. at 1148-49. 
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about the decline of authority. But he cites no decision or scholarly 
research to support his argument about the perceived decline of vital-
ity or value. Nor does Kahn cite any basis for his ultimate disparage-
ment of local public life: the suggestion that many identify local 
communities "with prejudice, discrimination, censorship, and ideolog-
ical rigidity."S4 
The decline in authority and the perceived decline in vitality or 
value will continue, he argues, because so many persons experience 
national military service, move across state and local boundaries, and 
receive information, ideas, art, and literature from beyond the commu-
nity. ss Kahn concludes that, accordingly, "[a] vibrant state constitu-
tionalism must be founded on something other than anachronistic 
beliefs about state sovereignty as an expression of state differences."S6 
Not only do Kahn's arguments lack empirical support, they make 
assumptions about the decline of groups, associations, and communi-
ties that are simply wrong. Although some structures that were once 
powerful have weakened considerably, such as city political machines 
and union . locals, others are replacing them. These new structures, 
from citizen anticrime groups to women's and gay-lesbian coalitions, 
have and exercise power locally. These groups act within their com-
munities, help shape locaj understandings, and actively push for 
change - often fundamental change. 
Next,s7 Kahn argues that constitutionalism is an interpretive en-
terprise that is not bound to a single truth or set of truths. ss He argues 
further that the interpretive enterprise in the United States has sought 
for two centuries to reconcile the nation's commitment to a rule of law 
- undergirded by the values of equality, liberty, and due process -
and its commitment to rule by the majority.s9 Constitutional text, to 
the extent that it is of "constitutional dimension ... is interpreted in 
light of the larger constitutional commitment to liberty, equality, and 
due process, as well as an understanding of the meaning of representa-
tive government."60 
Kahn would enlist state j1:1dges into this American interpretive en-
terprise. "The effort of each [state] judge should be to construct the 
best interpretation of equality [or liberty or due process] of which he 
54. Id. at 1149. 
55. See id. at 1149-50 (citing U.S. Supreme Court decisions and James Madison). 
56. Id. at 1150. 
57. Before making the next argument described in the text, Kahn criticizes Justice William 
Brennan's support of state constitutional decisionmaking as "not an acknowledgment of a vi-
brant, state-centered c:Ommunity life, but rather an attempt to enlist the states in the liberal 
project of defending the individual against authority." Id. at 1151. 
58. See id. at 1156-58; see also PAUL W. KAHN, LEGmMACY AND HISTORY: SELF-GOV-
ERNMENT IN AMERICAN CoNSTITUTIONAL THEORY (1992). 
59. See Kahn, supra note 36, at 1153-59. 
60. Id. at 1159. 
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or she is capable."61 Remarkably, he believes that the state judge is 
not bound to his or her state's texts, traditions, and history. He argues 
that "[t]he inquiry might turn to any number of texts, precedents, or 
historical events, as well as moral intuitions and· principled argu-
ments. "62 "We distort this process if we conc~ive of it as an effort to 
put into place a loc~ community's unique concept of equality [or lib-
erty or due process], instead of the constitutional goal of equality [or 
liberty or due process] that is a common aspiration of American 
lifi ·~ . . e. 
Not only does Kahn miss the legal mandate imposed upon judges 
by their oaths of office and the historical teaching discussed above, but 
he misses the broad landscape of state constitutionalism. Although 
liberty, equality, and fairness may encompass the world of constitu-
tional law, Kahn misses the point that many developments of state 
constitutional law will not be part of the Federal Constitution for 
years, decades, or longer, if at all. If they will not be part of the Fed-
eral Constitution, then the enterprise of an American constitutional 
law is tilting at windmills. 
As I show below, 64 the p·eople by their own initiative have· pro-
tected women and men more in some states than the national govern-
ment is likely to do for quite some time. The 'protection of privacy at 
the state level, for example, is years ahead of federal constitutional 
law. Protection of access to courts and protection of victims appear to 
be topics that the federal judiciary may not address on its own. 
Both Gardner and Kahn conceive of "modernism" as in part a 
movement away from local power to national power and away from 
local identity to national identity. Without conceding that this is an 
accurate description of social reality, I suggest that the forms of 
Mosaic fundamental law as understood by modern critical Bible schol-
arship are as modern, and as influential, today as they were twenty-five 
hundred years ago. Modern fundamental law is a mixture of basic 
national rights and broad national values with sometimes differing and 
more protective local rights and values. 
V. PROGRESSIVE STATE CONSTITUTIONALISM 
A brief overview of several developing state constitutional issues 
shows that both Gardner's and Kahn's theories are challenged by the 
distinctiveness of local development. The overview begins with rights 
to equality, protected specifically under state and federal constitutions, 
and then proceeds to rights to privacy, rights of access to courts, and 
61. Id. at 1161. 
62. Id. 
63. Id. 
64. See infra notes 70-90 and acci>mpanying text. 
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rights of victims, all of which are protected specifically under state 
constitutions and - to an increasingly lesser extent, if at all - under 
the Federal Constitution. 
A. Equality, a Right Specially Protected Under Federal and Most 
State Constitutions 
In the Federal Constitution, protections for equality derive princi-
pally from the Equal Protection Clause. Among the states, by con-
trast, there are four categories of language, some of them more 
specifically protective and some more broadly protective of equality 
than the federal provision. 6s 
The first category of language, found in thirteen states, is similar to 
that of the federal provision. 66 A second category of language, by con-
trast with equal protection language, prohibits the award of special 
privileges or immunities to persons and classes and appears in sixteen 
state constitutions. 67 A third category of language, used in at least six 
states, does not grant equal protection but instead guarantees equality 
of rights in general language. 68 A fourth category of language protects 
equality in class-specific language and appears in twenty-three state 
constitutions, including eighteen that use gender-specific clauses. 69 
The class-specific protections exceed federal constitutional protec-
tion. For example, Florida specifically prohibits denials of equality on 
the basis of physical handicap, 70 while the Supreme Court has inter-
preted the Federal Constitution to give very little protection against 
65. Friesen ably 'discusses these provisions, and the text of this review owes much to her 
discussion. See FRIESEN, supra note 30, para. 3.01. 
66. CAL. CoNST. art. I, § 7(a); CoNN. CONST. art. I, § 20; GA. CONST. art. I, § 1, para. 2; 
HAW. CoNST. art. I,§ S; ILL. CoNST. art. I,§ 2; LA. CONST. art. I,§ 3; ME. CONST. art. I,§ 6-
A; MICH. CONST. art. I,§ 2; MONT. CONST. art. II, § 4; N.M. CONST. art. II,§ 18; N.Y. CONST. 
art. I, § 11; N.C. CoNST. art. I, § 19; S.C. CoNST. art. I, § 3. 
67. See ALA. CoNST. art. I, § 22; ARIZ. CoNST. art. II, § 13; ARK. CONST. art. II, § 18; CAL. 
CoNST. art. I, § 7(b); CoNN. CoNST. art. I, § l; IND. CONST. art. I, § 23; IOWA CONST. art. I, 
§ 6; KY. CoNST. § 3; N.C. CoNST. art. I, § 32; N.D. CONST. art. I, § 21; OR. CONST. art. I,§ 20; 
S.D. CoNST. art. VI, § 18; TEX. CoNST. art. I, § 3; VT. CONST. ch. 1, art. VII; VA. CONST. art. I, 
§ 4; WASH. CoNST. art. I, § 12. 
68. See FLA. CoNST. art. I, § 2; KAN. CoNST. Bill of Rights § 1; KY. CONST. §§ 1, 3; Mo. 
CoNST. art. I, § 2; Tux. CoNST. art. I, § 3; WYO. CONST. art. I, § 2. Some of these states, in 
addition to general protective language, have class-specific protection in either the same or an-
other section of their constitutions. See infra note 69. Other states combine this general Ian· 
guage with a specific equal protection grant. See, e.g., ME. CONST. art. I, § 6-A; MICH. CONST. 
art. I, §§ 1, 2. 
69. See ALASKA CoNST. art. I, § 3; CAL. CONST. art. I, § 8; COLO. CONST. art. II, § 29; 
CoNN. CoNST. art. I,§ 20; FLA. CONST. art. I,§ 2; HAW. CONST. art. I,§§ S, 21; ILL. CONST. 
art. I, § 18; LA. CoNST. art. I, § 3; ME. CONST. art. I, § 6-A; Mo. CONST. art. XXXXVI; MASS. 
CoNST. pt.'1, art. I; MONT. CONST. art. II,§ 4; N.H. CONST. pt. 1, art. II; N.J. CONST. art. I, 
§ S; N.M. CoNST. art. II, § 18; N.Y. CONST. art. I,§ 11; N.C. CONST. art. I, § 19; PA. CONST. 
art. I,§ 26; TEX. CoNST. art. I,§ 3a; UTAH CONST. art. IV,§ l; VA. CONST. art. I,§ 11; WASH. 
CoNST. art. XXXI, § 1; WYO. CoNST. art. I, § 3, art. VI, § 1. 
70. FLA. CoNST. art. I, § 2. 
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such discrimination. 71 Texas coilrts have interpreted its equal rights 
amendment to give out-of-wedlock fathers parity with mothers in le-
gitimation actions,72 in contrast to federal law.73 Washington courts 
have interpreted that state's equal rights amendment to prohibit gen-
der discrimination, not simply to subject such discrimination to strict 
scrutiny; thus, they applied the amendment to strike down a rule bar-
, ring girls froni playing on a high school football team.74 
Even when state language is the same as or similar to federal lan-
guage, su9h as California's equal protection language, state protection 
exceeds· federal protection. California is an example of a state in 
which the courts have interpreted equal protection language more 
broadly than the federal courts, though Californians have voted to 
keep equal protection in one area at the federal floor. The California 
courts have protected homosexuals against employment discrimina-
tion 75 and have accepted statistical proof of disparate impact against 
women as sufficient to trigger strict scrutiny.76 The California courts 
had also held that both de facto and de jure school discrimination vio-
late the state equal protection clause, 77 but the people by ballot have 
limited the reach of the state clause to that of the federal clause in 
school cases. 7ir 
B. Privacy, a Right Generally Protected Under the Federal 
Constitution and Specifically Protected Under Many State 
Constitutions 
There is no specific protection of privacy under the Federal Consti-
tution. The federal courts have, however, given some protection to 
privacy interests under the Due Process Clauses. 79 By contrast, ten 
states have eleven specific protections of privacy, five in freestanding 
clauses,80 and six by express language in search-and-seizure clauses.81 
Others, like the federal courts, have interpreted due process and natu-
71. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., inc., 473 U.S. 313 (1985). 
72. See In re McLean, 725 S.W.2d 696 (fex. 1987). 
73. See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989). 
74. See Darrin v. Gould, 540 P.2d 882 (Wash. 1975). 
75. See Gay Law Students Assn. v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 595 P.2d 592 (Cal. 1979). 
76. See Boren v. California Dept. of Employment Dev., 130 Cal. Rptr. 683 (Ct. App. 1976). 
77. See Crawford v. Board of Educ., 551 P.2d 28 (Cal. 1976). 
78. CAL. CoNsr. art. I, § 7(a), as amended by Proposition I (1979); see Crawford v. Board of 
Educ., 458 U.S. 527 (1982) (upholding Proposition I). 
79. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 
113 (1973). . 
80. See ALAsKA CoNsr. art. I,§ 22; CAL. CONsr. art. I,§ l; FLA. CoNsr. art. I,§ 23; HAW. 
CoNsr. art. I, § 6; MONT. CoNsr. art. II, § 10. 
81. ARIZ. CoNsr. art. II,§ 8; HAW. CoNsr. art. I,§ 7; ILL. CoNsr. art. I,§ 6; LA. CoNsr. 
art. I, § 5; s.c. CoNsr. rut. I, § 10; w ASH. CONsr. art. I, § 7. 
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ral rights clauses to protect privacy. 82 
State protection of privacy exceeds federal protection in many in-
stances, such as a higher standard protecting a woman's right to 
choose to terminate a pregnancy, 83 funding of abortions for poor wo-
men, 84 and recognition of gay marriage. 85 California, unlike the fed-
eral government, guarantees fundamental privacy protection against 
private action. 86 
C. Rights to Remedies and Rights of Victims, Rights "Unknown" to 
the Federal Constitution 
The Federal Constitution, with its Due Process Clause and its 
Retention of Rights Clause, may someday include several new rights, 
however unknown today. Nonetheless, it is noteworthy that states ex-
plicitly protect rights that, unlike privacy, are at best on the fringes of 
the Federal Constitution. Examples of these are a right to remedies 
and victims' rights provisions. 
Most state constitutions guarantee that their courts will be "open" 
- a guarantee that courts frequently have construed to preserve com-
mon law remedies for injuries to persons. For example, a court held a 
Texas statute limiting the award of damages to $500,000 for any medi-
cal malpractice injury, with the exception of necessary expenses for 
treatment, unconstitutional under such a provision. 87 Another court 
attempted to construe a right-to-remedy provision to strike down a 
state governmental immunity provision. 88 The federal courts have not 
made any similar decisions, and indeed, history counsels against such 
a construction of at least the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause. 89 
Finally, eleven states now have victims' rights provisions in their 
state constitutions.90 It is too early to know how significantly these 
provisions will affect personal security, but nonetheless, their guaran-
82. See, e.g., Doe v. Maher, 515 A.2d 134 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1986); Greenberg v. Kim· 
melman, 494 A.2d 294, 304 (N.J. 1985). 
83. See In re T.W., 551 So. 2d 1186, 1196 (Fla. 1989). 
84. See Right to Choose v. Byrne, 450 A.2d 925 (N.J. 1982). 
85. See Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993) (applying strict scrutiny to a statute dis-
criminating against single-sex marriages). 
86. See Luck v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 267 Cal. Rptr. 618, 627-28 (Ct. App.) (finding 
that California law guarantees protection for privacy rights against intrusion by private actors, 
unless the private actor can show a compelling interest), cert denied, 498 U.S. 939 (1990). 
87. See Lucas v. United States, 757 S.W.2d 687 (fex. 1988) (holding TEX. REV. C1V. STAT. 
ANN. art. 4590i, §§ 11.02-.03 (Vernon Supp. 1986} unconstitutional under TEX. CONST. art I, 
§ 13). 
88. See Pfost v. State, 713 P.2d 495 (Mont. 1985), overruled by Meech v. Hillhaven W., Inc, 
776 P.2d 488 (Mont. 1989). 
89. See David Schuman, Oregon's Remedy Guarantee: Article I, Section JO of the Oregon 
Constitution, 65 OR. L. REv. 35, 39-40 (1986) (explaining that the suggested access·to-court 
provisions in the Bill of Rights were never included). 
90. See ARIZ. CoNST. art. II, § 2.1; CAL. CONST. art. I, § 28; FLA. CONST. art. I, § 16(b); 
ILL. CoNST. art. I, § 8.1; MICH. CONST. art. I, § 24; Mo. CONST. art. I, § 32; N.J. CoNST. art. 1, 
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tee that victims may be present and heard in criminal proceedings and 
California's guarantee of restitution may be sources of protection not 
soon encompassed by the Federal Due Process Clause. 
CONCLUSION: FOLLOWING THE MODERNIST MOSAIC FORM 
It is not news for the Law Page of The New York Times that the 
form of American fundamental law reflects the forms of Mosaic law 
twenty-five hundred years ago and emulated first in Massachusetts and 
Pennsylvania three hundred to three hundred and fifty years ago. It is 
not news that there are basic national rights and broadly defined na-
tional values, and that within that framework states and communities 
are free to enhance liberty. Perhaps it is news, however, that so much 
of the enhancement of liberty is the handiwork of local groups, as-
sociations, and communities, and not the judiciary. 
None of this should be especially surprising. As Leo Strauss 
observed: 
[K]nowledge of the indefinitely large variety of notions of right and 
wrong is so far from being incompatible with the idea of natural right 
that it is the essential condition for the emergence of that idea: realiza-
tion of the variety of notions of right is the incentive for the quest for 
natural right.91 
God etched fundamental law in stone. Moses broke the first set of 
tablets. The second set disappeared. Then the people canonized the 
varieties of fundamental law. 
para. 22; N.M. CoNsr. art. II, § 24; R.I. CoNsr. art. I, § 23; TEX. CoNsr. art. I, § 30; w ASH. 
CoNsr. art. I, § 35. 
91. LEO STRAUSS, NATURAL RIGHT AND HlSfORY 10 (1953), quoted in Robert P. George, 
Natural Law and Civil Rights: From Jefferson's Letter to Henry Lee to Martin Luther King's 
Letter from Birmingham Jail, 43 CATH. U. L. REV. 143, 148 (1993); see Joseph Boyle, Natural 
Law and the Ethics of Traditions, in NATURAL LAW THEORY 3 (Robert P. George ed., 1992). 
